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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to analyze if cooperation can be the product of cultural
evolution in a two-stage coordination game, consisting of a production stage fol-
lowed by a negotiation phase. We present an overlapping generations model with
cultural transmission of preferences where the distribution of preferences in the pop-
ulation and the strategies are determined endogenously and simultaneously. There
are several groups in the society; some of them play cooperatively and others do
not. Socialization takes place inside the group, but there is a positive rate of migra-
tion among groups which parents anticipate. Our main result shows that all groups
converge to the cooperative equilibrium.
Keywords: Cultural Transmission, Coordination Game, Social Preferences, Co-
operation, Migration.
JEL classification: C78; D64; D63.
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1 Introduction.
Most of the economic, social and biological research trying to explain the appearance, mainte-
nance and evolution of cooperation in human societies has frequently used the prisoner’s dilemma
as a simple game that exemplifies this central problem. But researchers have neglected the study
of another old social dilemma that from our point of view deserves at least as much attention
as the prisoner’s dilemma: a simple coordination game, known as the stag hunt. This game for-
malizes a story told by Rousseau of two hunters who could cooperate by jointly hunting a stag
or defect by individually hunting a hare. In contrast to a prisoner’s dilemma, where defection
is the best response regardless of the other’s strategy, in stag-hunt games, defection is the best
response to defection, but cooperation is the best response to cooperation. Thus, the stag hunt
has two equilibria, one where players cooperate and another where they defect.
The viability of cooperation in the society within and among groups depends on mutual
beliefs and rests on trust. This crucial dimension of cooperation is much better captured in the
stag hunt game than in the prisoner’s dilemma. In this latter game there is a conflict between
individual rationality and mutual benefits (efficiency), while in the stag hunt there is a conflict
between mutual benefits and personal risk. In other words, it is rational to cooperate but you
need to trust mutually to do so.
The stag hunt or coordination game has been analyzed in the literature from an evolutionary
approach. Most of this work shows that it is difficult to escape the inefficient but risk dominant
equilibrium in an evolutionary setting (see, for instance, Kandori et al. 1993, Young 1993
and Ellison 1993). The experimental evidence also shows that cooperative solutions to the
coordination problem are not as easy to obtain as one might think (Cooper, 1999). Groups can
get “stuck” at a non cooperative equilibrium (van Huyck et al. 1990).
A common feature in these previous works is that they analyze an “isolated” one-shot coor-
dination game; that is, payoffs are uniquely determined by the players´ choices when generating
surplus, without depending upon any additional action. But most of the economic interactions
1
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that turn out to have a coordination game structure are actually sequential two-stage games.
Players firstly make productive decisions, generating a joint surplus, and subsequently, they
bargain over its division among them.
A well-known and important example is the hold up problem on specific investments in an
incomplete contract scenario. Some authors (see for instance, Ellingsen and Robles 2002, Troge¨r
2002 and Dawid and McLeod 2001) have investigated two-stage hold up games in an evolutionary
framework. In their models, players distribute the obtained surplus between them employing a
symmetric and fixed bargaining procedure (a simultaneous Nash demand game).
However, these papers are concerned with the magnitude of investment. We, on the other
hand, are concerned with a qualitative aspect of investment. In particular, agents often must
choose the degree to which their investments are relationship specific. Of course, the more
relationship specific the agent’s investment, the worse is that agent´s outside option. That is,
choices in the production stage influence the allocation of bargaining power in later stages.
In our model, players choose simultaneously between cooperation and non-cooperation in the
production stage and thereafter, in the second stage, surplus is distributed through a negotiation
mechanism that depends upon behavior in the first stage. If both players cooperate, they have
equal bargaining power. If one player cooperates and the other does not, we assume that the
latter has all the bargaining power.
Cooperation in this game means specialization, that is, to choose a relation-specific invest-
ment or action, while non-cooperation means non specialization or to choose a general-purpose
investment or action. Economic surplus arises and increases with specialization and mutual
cooperation. But the distribution of the obtained surplus depends on the relative ex post bar-
gaining strength of the partners which is in turn negatively correlated with specialization. This
is the original story behind the stag hunt game: each player has to make a decision between spe-
cializing in hunting a stag or hunting hare. However, it is needed bilateral cooperation in order
to catch the stag with positive probability, while catching a hare is a matter of solo production.
We think that in real life many bilateral joint ventures fit in this framework (for instance,
2
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marriage, joint research...). Labour division and specialization increase total surplus but weaken
the bargaining power of the party who specializes. For instance, firms and workers often invest
in job-specific assets and job-related training whose returns are shared through subsequent wage
negotiations. If investments are non-contractible, this scenario generally results in a trade-off:
highly specific investments yield a larger surplus to be divided between the partners but reduce
the ex post bargaining position of the investor, provided his partner has chosen a less specific
type of investment. There is a conflict between mutual benefit and the individual risk of getting
locked in the relationship with a very weak bargaining position and being exploited by the other
party in the negotiation stage.
When our two-stage coordination game is played by individuals with self-regarding prefer-
ences and solved backwards, it results in a particular version of the stag hunt game known as
assurance or mutualism game. The surplus when one player hunts hare (non-cooperation) while
the other hunts stag (cooperation) is greater than the surplus obtained when both hunt hare.
However, when the game is played by individuals with other-regarding preferences the structure
of the game changes and cooperation becomes the unique equilibrium.
In this paper we want to study if the Pareto dominant (cooperative) equilibrium can be
obtained (and if so, under which conditions) as the product of cultural evolution. We work
with a dynamic model of purposeful and costly cultural transmission, where the distribution of
preferences in the population and the strategies in the two-stage coordination game in the long
run are determined endogenously and simultaneously.
More precisely, we present an overlapping generations model where agents live for two pe-
riods. In the first period they are children who are educated in certain preferences or values.
In the second period, they are adults and are randomly matched with another members of the
population to play the two-stage coordination game.
Preferences in the population are heterogeneous. In each period there is a fraction of selfish
3
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players and there is also a fraction of players motivated by reciprocal altruism1.
Both the educational effort of their parents and the social environment influence a child’s
preferences. The distribution of preferences in the population evolves depending on the socializa-
tion effort of both types of parents, which is determined by two factors: their expectations about
the equilibrium to be played in the next generation and the current distribution of preferences
(since oblique transmission is a substitute of vertical transmission).
If the proportion of selfish players in the initial condition of the dynamics is high, then
there is still multiplicity of equilibria in the game with heterogeneous preferences. We assume
that there are several groups in the society; some of them play cooperatively and others do not.
Socialization takes place inside the group, but there is a positive rate of migration among groups
which parents anticipate.
Our main result is that, for very general conditions, in the globally stable steady state
of the society there will be a mixed distribution of preferences where both selfish and other-
regarding preferences are present and more importantly, all groups coordinate in the cooperative
equilibrium of the stag hunt game. The non cooperative groups eventually end up playing
cooperatively because the preference distribution in the group evolves increasing the proportion
of inequity averse individuals.
The driving force of the result is that the presence of a significant fraction of inequity averse
individuals in the population acts as a stock of social capital in the society. In other words,
it works as a good substitute for complete contracting, reducing personal risk, and this occurs
because of their aversion to inequality. In a population with a high proportion of inequity
averse individuals, their effect is so strong that cooperation is the unique equilibrium. Inequity
averse players are rather generous and fair when they have all the bargaining power, and this
makes cooperation the best response of selfish players even against defection. On the other
hand, inequity averse players credibly threat to punish opportunistic and greedy behaviour by
1In particular, we use the concept of inequity averse preferences of Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
4
Page 7 of 37
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
rejecting unfair offers in the negotiation. This makes selfish players behave also very generously
when they have all bargaining power.
Our paper is related to a cultural transmission literature in dynamic models of preference
evolution. Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and Boyd and Richerson (1985), in their seminal
work in evolutionary anthropology, were the first to propose models of cultural transmission with
exogenous socialization efforts. However we follow the class of cultural transmission models
first analyzed by Bisin and Verdier (1998) in which the socialization efforts are endogenous.
Moreover, Bisin et al. (2004) analyze the evolution of cooperation in a context where players
play a prisoner’s dilemma and in which there is also heterogeneity of preferences.
Sandholm (2001) presents a two speed dynamic analysis of the evolution of preferences in a
2x2 game. Gradual changes in preferences are accompanied by immediate behavioral adjust-
ments that maintain equilibrium play. He shows how aggregate behavior can jump discretely in
an instant of evolutionary time in coordination games. However, in this work, preferences evolve
according to an indirect evolutionary approach, although this approach can be interpreted as a
cultural transmission model where preferences that lead to economic success are more likely to
be transmitted to subsequent generations.
Kuran and Sandholm (2008) analyse a pure coordination game (in material payoffs) in which
agents also care about identity-driven personal ideals, captured by an individual-specific prefer-
ence parameter. For any given preference parameter profile in a community, there is a unique
Nash equilibrium in the random matching game. Cultural evolution is driven by parents’ trans-
mission and by self-persuasion. The main goal of this paper is the analysis of cultural integration
when there is cross-cultural interaction betwen communities. In particular, any individual has a
positive probability of playing the coordination game and culturally interacting with members
from the other community.
Our model shares with these papers that we also work with cultural transmission as the
engine of preferences and behavior evolution and that we also assume a two speed adjustment
process. But there are several relevant differences. On the one hand, instead of analyzing a
5
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pure coordination game, we study a two stage game that results in a coordination game in
material payoffs. The second stage, the sharing or negotiation stage, turns out to be crucial for
the working of social preferences. On the other hand, our main interest lies in the equilibrium
selection problem. We want to know if the interaction of cultural transmission and migration
between culturally non-isolated populations yields convergence to the cooperative equilibrium.
But in our model immigrants play the equilibrium played in their new community. Therefore,
the possibility of migration only influences the socialization effort of parents, affecting in this
way the preferences distribution in the original population. This change in preferences can in
turn cause a shift in the equilibrium played.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the two-stage incomplete information
coordination game. In Section 3 we obtain and characterize the equilibria of the game. Section
4 summarizes the mechanism of cultural transmission of preferences and analyzes the optimal
education effort choice of the different types of parents. Section 5 presents our main result on
migration among groups and cooperation. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
2 A coordination game with a distribution phase.
Players are randomly matched into pairs in each period to play a two-stage game. We denote
these stages as the production and distribution stage, respectively.
In the production stage, each player has to decide, independently and simultaneously, whether
to cooperate (C) or not to cooperate (NC) and their pair of actions determines the surplus ob-
tained. If both players cooperate it is jointly obtained the highest total surplus, denoted by
2B. If only one of them cooperates it is obtained a surplus of size d. And, finally, if both
players do not cooperate, then they obtain the lowest surplus denoted by 2b. We assume that
B > d > 2b > 0. Therefore, the efficient outcome of this situation is the one in which both
players choose the cooperative action.
In the distribution stage, we suppose that, after observing the realized surplus, players
6
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bargain following an ultimatum game with the following characteristics depending on the pair
of first stage actions. If both players cooperate, they have equal bargaining power, that is,
they get to be the proposer with equal probability. If one player cooperates and the other does
not cooperate, we assume that the latter has all the bargaining power, that is, he will be the
proposer in the ultimatum game. And finally, if both players do not cooperate, we assume, for
simplicity, that no additional action is taken and each one obtains a payoff of b.
This game represents a bilateral joint venture. As we mentioned in the introduction, co-
operation means specialization, that is, to choose a relation-specific action or investment, while
non-cooperation means non specialization or to choose a general-purpose action or investment.
Therefore, we are assuming quite realistically that economic surplus increases with specialization
and mutual cooperation.
The distribution of the generated surplus depends on the relative ex post bargaining strength
of the partners which is in turn negatively correlated with specialization. The reason is very intu-
itive: when a subject makes a general investment, he has a valuable outside option. Conversely,
if he makes a specific investment, he has a small outside option. Therefore, in the former case,
the player has a high bargaining power and in the latter case he has a low bargaining power2.
Assume, as conventional economics and game theory do, that all players have self-regarding
preferences and are risk neutral. Selfish players accept any division of the surplus when they are
responders in the ultimatum negotiation game. And they offer nothing to the responder when
they are the proposers and have all the bargaining power.
Therefore, if we solve the two-stage game by backward induction, we find that the players
are facing the following simultaneous game in the production stage:
2This result is shown formally in a general bargaining model in Olcina and Penyarrubia(2002).
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C NC
C B,B 0, d
NC d, 0 b, b
This coordination game is also known as the assurance or mutualism game (because d > 2b).
For instance, consider an actual stag hunt game. It is assumed that the number (or the size) of
the captured hares is greater whenever there is no competition in hunting hare with the other
player. This coordination game has two (subgame perfect) Nash equilibria: one in which both
players cooperate in the first stage (C, C) and another in which they do not cooperate (NC,
NC). Nothing in the rational behavior of the players prevents choosing one of the two equilibria.
A clear answer to this problem of equilibrium selection remains elusive.
Social preferences.
Until recently standard game theory has assumed that all players are self-regarding, in the
sense that they are only motivated by their own monetary payoff. However, there are many
pieces of experimental data that indicates that a significant fraction of the subjects does not
care only about absolute material payoffs but rather relative payoffs. These experiments suggest
that fairness and reciprocity motives affect the behaviour of many people, but not all people.
A number of theoretical models have been developed in the literature to obtain reciprocal
behaviour. Well-known examples include Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfelds
(2000)´s models of inequity aversion, Charness and Rabin (2002)´s model of quasi-maximin
preferences, Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)´s models of intention-based
reciprocity. These models can lead to different predictions in some particular games, but in our
two-stage game they all deliver the same qualitative results. We choose the inequity aversion
preferences model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) for tractability reasons.
We assume that in each period t there is a proportion, pt , of self-interested players in the
population and another proportion, 1− pt, of players motivated by inequity aversion.
8
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Let x = (x1, x2) denote the vector of monetary payoffs for both players. The utility function
of an inequity averse player i is given by:
Ui(x) = xi − αimax{xj − xi, 0} − βimax{xi − xj, 0}, j 6= i (1)
where βi ≤ αi and 0 ≤ βi < 1.
Inequity averse agents are willing to give up some material payoff to move in the direction of
more equitable outcomes. The second term in (1) measures the utility loss from disadvantageous
inequity, while the third term measures the loss from advantageous inequity. The assumption
βi ≤ αi implies that a player suffers more from inequity that is to his disadvantage, that is,
the inequity aversion is asymmetric. We are interested in strongly inequity averse players, those
with the parameters β > 0.5.3
The utility function of selfish players are characterized by the above utility functions with
αi = βi = 0, that is, Ui(x) = xi.
3 Cooperation and Equilibrium Behaviour.
In this section we characterize the perfect bayesian equilibria of the two stage incomplete in-
formation game described in the previous section. In this game, no player knows the true type
of player that he is randomly matched with but he knows the distribution of preferences of the
population from which a player is drawn. We will start analyzing the behaviour of both types
of players in the distribution (negotiation) phase.
3.1 Behaviour of inequity averse players.
Strongly inequity averse players behave very differently in a negotiation as compared to selfish
players. In particular they are very generous as proposers and they are willing to reject greedy
3We also assume that the following condition holds for the inequity averse players:
α ≤ (2β − 1)/(2(1− β)).
This condition establishes an upper bound on parameter α, which is decreasing with parameter α.
9
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offers as responders.
When inequity averse players are responders, they will only accept a certain proportion
of the surplus and will reject any offer below this threshold level, depending on their degree of
(disadvantageous) inequity aversion (α). We denote this proportion as their acceptance threshold
(tα). This share of the surplus is the result of making the responder player indifferent between
accepting and rejecting the offer. In order to compute it, we equalize to zero the utility function
where, without loss of generality, we have normalized the surplus to one. Thus tα−α(1−2tα) = 0
and therefore tα = α/(1 + 2α). Note that this threshold is increasing in α and strictly less than
one-half for any finite α.
If the inequity averse player gets to be the proposer in the ultimatum game it is easy to verify
that it is a dominant strategy for him to always offer an equal split of the surplus. The fair
offer will be accepted by his opponent whatever his type is. Notice that starting in an unequal
distribution advantageous for him, giving an additional monetary unit to his opponent, reduces
in one unit his material payoff and consequently his utility, but it reduces also in two units the
inequity and as β > 0.5, increases his utility in more than one unit. The net effect is an increase
in his total utility.
Summarizing, there is a dominant action for strongly inequity averse players, when they are
proposers, which is to offer an equal split of the surplus and when they are responders, they will
only accept a proportion of the current surplus greater or equal than tα. Notice that this result
holds both under complete and incomplete information.
3.2 Behaviour of selfish players.
Selfish players accept any division of the surplus when they are responders in the ultimatum
negotiation game, they will never reject any offer. However, the presence of a fraction of inequity
averse agents in the population induces changes in the behaviour of selfish agents as proposers.
Let us analyze this behavior when a selfish player faces with probability 1 an inequity averse
10
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player. The selfish player will anticipate that his opponent rejects any offer smaller than the
threshold tα, and therefore, he will offer exactly a proportion tα of the surplus which will be
accepted by the inequity averse player, although the latter gets an utility of zero.
If we assume that the row player is selfish and the column player is inequity averse, and
solving by backward induction, the payoff matrix that the players face in the production stage
is the following:
C NC
C (1− tα + 1/2)B,B/2 d/2, d/2
NC (1− tα)d, 0 b, b
It is easy to verify that cooperation is a dominant action for the selfish player. Thus, in this
game with complete information, there is a unique perfect Nash equilibrium in which both types
of players cooperate achieving the efficient outcome.
The intuition behind this result is the following. Cooperation is the best response for a
selfish player also against non-cooperation, when he is confronted with probability one with an
inequity averse opponent. The reason is that the latter does share equally even after defection.
In other words, as strongly inequity averse players are very generous, selfish players do not fear
being exploited by a defector.
However, players do not know the true type of the player with whom they are matched with
in period t. They know, as was mentioned above, that there is a proportion pt of self-interested
agents and a proportion 1− pt of inequity averse players.
The acceptance policy of a selfish player as a responder does not change with incomplete
information. However, his behaviour as a proposer is indeed affected by the existence of a
fraction of inequity averse individuals. Note that the particular realized surplus can also change
his beliefs about his opponent’s type. We will denote by µt the updated probability that any
player assigns to the fact that his opponent is selfish after observing the result of the production
stage. Therefore, a selfish proposer has two options. First, to offer 0 and his expected payoff
11
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would be the proportion µt of the realized surplus because only selfish players would accept this
offer . And, second, to offer the threshold level tα and his payoff would be a proportion (1− tα)
of the realized surplus, as in this case both types of players will accept. Therefore, offering 0 is
better than offering tα when µt ≥ (1− t
α).
The following lemma summarizes this result.
Lemma 1 If the selfish player gets to be the proposer in the negotiation stage, he will offer zero
to his opponent if µt ≥ (1− t
α) and the acceptance threshold tα if µt < (1− t
α).
Once we have analyzed the optimal bargaining behaviour of both types of players in the
incomplete information game, we will next characterize the perfect bayesian equilibria of this
game.
3.3 Equilibria with incomplete information.
The following two lemmas characterize the two pooling equilibria in which both types of players
choose the same action in the production stage. We will set off-equilibrium beliefs to be as
pessimistic as possible, that is, deviation are always believed to be by a selfish type.
Lemma 2 The Cooperative Equilibrium.
For every pt, there exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which both types of players choose
the cooperative action C in the production stage of the game.
The equilibrium actions in the distribution stage are:
1) for inequity averse players: to offer half of the surplus (B) as a proposer and to accept
only offers greater or equal than tα2B as a responder.
2) for selfish players: to accept every offer as a responder and to offer zero if pt ≥ (1 − t
α)
and to offer tα2B if pt < (1− t
α) as a proposer.
Proof: see Appendix.
12
Page 15 of 37
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Notice that if pt < (1 − t
α) this cooperative equilibrium is efficient, and the equilibrium
payoffs are ptB+(1−pt)B/2 and B−ptB/2 for the selfish player and the inequity averse player,
respectively. However, if pt ≥ (1 − t
α) this equilibrium is inefficient because inequity averse
players reject the unfair offers of selfish players, leading to surplus destruction. In this case, the
equilibrium payoffs are B − tαB + ptt
αB + B/2− ptB/2 and B/2 + (1 − pt)B/2 for the selfish
player and the inequity averse player respectively.
However, for some values of the distribution of preferences, there is also a pooling equilibrium
in which no player chooses the cooperative action in the first stage, that is, the multiplicity of
equilibria of the complete information stag-hunt game persists. In the next lemma we charac-
terize this non-cooperative equilibrium.
Lemma 3 The Non-Cooperative Equilibrium.
If pt ≥ p′ = (d− 2b)/d, there exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, in which both types of
players choose non cooperation (NC) in the production stage.
Proof: see Appendix.
The equilibrium payoff for both the selfish and the inequity averse player is b.
Next we comment on the existence of separating equilibria in which the two types of players
choose different actions in the production stage. Firstly, non-cooperation by the selfish players
and cooperation by the inequity averse players does not form part of an equilibrium. On the one
hand, selfish players desire to separate from inequity averse players only if there is a sufficiently
high proportion pt of selfish players in the population. But, on the other hand, inequity averse
players desire to separate from selfish players only if there is a sufficiently low proportion pt of
selfish players. It can be shown that there is no population preference distribution for which
both incentive-compatible restrictions are satisfied simultaneously. Secondly, there is not either
a separating equilibrium in which selfish players cooperate and inequity averse players do not,
because the latter will deviate to cooperation. Concluding, there are no separating equilibria in
this game. A formal proof of this statement can be found in the Appendix.
13
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ptWe can summarize the previous results in a more compact form in the following proposition:Proposition 1 For every pt, there exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which both types of
players choose the cooperative action in the production stage of the coordination game. Further-
more, if pt ≥ p′ = (d − 2b)/d, there exists another Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which both
types of players choose the non-cooperative action in the production stage.
Given the results obtained in section 3.2 in a complete information scenario between a selfish
and an inequity averse player, it is not surprising at all that for preferences distributions with a
sufficiently low proportion of selfish players, i.e. pt < p′, the unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
of the game with incomplete information is the Cooperative equilibrium. Cooperation is a
dominant strategy for selfish players. Even if inequity averse players do not cooperate, as they
are so generous in the negotiation stage offering half of the surplus d, selfish players prefer to
choose cooperation instead of non-cooperation. Furthermore, if pt < (1− t
α) selfish players will
be also generous negotiating the surplus and the cooperative equilibrium would be efficient.
But for preferences distributions with a high proportion of selfish players, that is, for pt > p′,
there exists also a Non-cooperative equilibrium. The intuition is that, if there is a majority of
selfish individuals in the population, then this type will not deviate from non-cooperation since
they correctly expect that selfish players do not make fair offers in this situation. Concerning
inequity averse players, if they deviate to cooperation, they will have to reject unfair offers of
selfish players obtaining a payoff of zero.
The existence of multiplicity of equilibria for the range of parameters pt ≥ p′, poses a
question on which will be the expected equilibrium a given period. This multiplicity problem
will be tackled in a dynamic framework that we will introduce in the next section.
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4 The socialization process and the parent´s educational effort.
In this section we present the dynamic model that describes the evolution of the distribution of
preferences along with strategies in the two-stage coordination game analyzed in the previous
sections.
We consider overlapping generations of agents who only live two periods (as a young and as
an adult). In the first period, the agent is a child and is educated in certain preferences and in
the second period (as an adult with well defined preferences), is randomly matched with another
adult player, to play the two-stage coordination game. In this second period, any adult player
has one offspring and has to make a (costly) decision regarding his child’s education, trying
to transmit his own preferences. As it is usual in this sort of model we assume that fertility is
exogenous, that is, an adult has only one child independently of his performance in the two-stage
game, and thus the population size remains constant. It is also assumed that reproduction is
asexual, with a parent per child.
Preferences among players are influenced by a purposeful and costly socialization process.
Children acquire preferences through observation, imitation and learning of cultural models
prevailing in their social and cultural environment. We will draw from the model of cultural
transmission of Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and, in particular, from Bisin and Verdier
(1998, 2000).
Let τ i ∈ [0, 1] be the educational effort made by a parent of type i where i ∈ {e, a} and
e denotes selfish and a denotes strongly inequity averse.
The socialization mechanism works as follows. Consider a parent with i preferences. His
child is first directly exposed to the parent’s preferences and is socialized to this preferences with
probability τ i chosen by the parent (vertical transmission); with complementary probability
1− τ i, this direct socialization fails, and the child is socialized to his preferences by a randomly
chosen member of the population (oblique transmission). In this case, his preferences are selfish
with probability pt and inequity averse with probability (1− pt).
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Let P ij denote the probability that a child of a parent with preferences i is socialized to
preferences j. The socialization mechanism is then characterized by the following transition
probabilities:
P eet = τ
e
t + (1− τ
e
t )pt (2)
P eat = (1− τ
e
t)(1 − pt) (3)
P aat = τ
a
t + (1− τ
a
t )(1− pt) (4)
P aet = (1− τ
a
t )pt (5)
Given these transition probabilities it is easy to characterize the dynamic behavior of pt:
pt+1 = [ptP
ee
t + (1− pt)P
ae
t ]. (6)
Substituting (2) to (5) we obtain:
pt+1 = pt + pt(1− pt)[τ
e
t − τ
a
t ]. (7)
Direct transmission is justified because parents are altruistic towards their children. But,
an important feature is that they have some kind of imperfect altruism: their socialization
decisions are not based on the purely material payoff expected for their children but on the
payoff as perceived by their parents according to their own preferences. This particular form of
myopia is called imperfect empathy. As a consequence, the cultural dynamics is not necessarilly
payoff-monotonic. Direct transmission is also costly. Let C(τ i) denote the cost of the education
effort τ i , i ∈ {e, a}. While it is possible to obtain similar results with any increasing and convex
cost function we will assume, for simplicity, the following quadratic form C(τ i) = (τ i)2/2k, with
k > 0. Therefore, a parent of type i chooses the education effort τ i ∈ [0, 1] at time t, which
maximizes
P iit (τ
i, pt)V
ii(pEt+1) + P
ij
t (τ
i, pt)V
ij(pEt+1)− (τ
i)2/2k,
where P ijare the transition probabilities and V ij is the utility to a parent with preferences i if
his child is of type j. Notice that the utility V ij depends on pEt+1 , which denotes the expectation
about the proportion of selfish players in period t+1. In this work we will assume that parents
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have adaptive or backward looking expectations, believing that the proportion of selfish players
will be the same in the next period as in the current period, that is, pEt+1 = pt.
Maximizing the above expression with respect to τ i, i ∈ {e, a}, we get the following optimal
education effort functions4:
τ e∗(pt) = k.∆V
e(pt).(1− pt),
τa∗(pt) = k.∆V
a(pt).pt.
Here ∆V e = V ee−V ea and ∆V a = V aa−V ae. That is, ∆V i is the net gain from socializing your
child to your own preferences. It can also interpreted as the cultural intolerance of parents with
respect to cultural deviation from their own preferences. According to the imperfect empathy
notion, parents obtain a higher utility if their children share their preferences, so these levels of
cultural intolerance are non-negative.
Note that the education effort τ e(pt) of a selfish parent decreases with the proportion of
selfish individuals in the population. The reason is very intuitive: the larger pt is, the better
children are socialized to the selfish preferences in the social environment. On the contrary, the
educational effort chosen by the inequity averse players τa(pt) increases with pt, that is, the
greater the proportion of selfish players in the population, the bigger the socialization effort of
the former parents in order to offset the pressure of the environment if they want their children
to share their own preferences. In other words, oblique transmission acts as a substitute for
vertical transmission. Bisin and Verdier (2000) refer to this feature of educational effort as the
cultural substitution property.
The other determinant of the optimal education effort is the relative profit ∆V i to a parent
of type i from transmitting her own cultural traits. Its value will depend on the expected
equilibrium of the game that their children, as adults, will face in the next period.
4In order to have interior solutions the parameter k must be chosen small enough so that in equilibrium τ i < 1.
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5 Migration, preference distribution and strategies in the long
run.
In this section we will characterize the steady states of the cultural dynamics when the individ-
uals coordinate in an equilibrium of the stag-hunt game. However, in section 3 we have shown
that for initial preference distributions greater than p′, there are two possible equilibria in the
society depending on whether the population coordinates in the cooperative equilibrium or in
the non-cooperative equilibrium. Therefore, for these values of the parameters we still have an
equilibria multiplicity problem.
Some authors have found this same problem and have just decided to select one of these equilib-
ria, that is, they assume that all the population or groups coordinate in the same equilibrium.
See, for instance, Bisin, Topa and Verdier (2004) and Mengel (2008). We think that this ap-
proach leaves unsolved the equilibrium selection problem. Instead of that, in order to obtain
endogenous equilibrium selection we will analyze the effects on the dynamics of the possibility
of migration among different groups.
We will assume that there are several populations (groups) where each one expects and plays a
particular equilibrium of the coordination game. Socialization takes place inside the group but
there is a (probably small) rate of migration γ among groups. That is, a proportion γ of adult
individuals migrate to another group to play the coordination game. They will play according
to the expectations and customs of their new group. In this new scenario, parents in each group
will socialize their offspring taking now into account that when their children become adults,
they will have a positive probability of migrating and therefore ending up playing a different
equilibrium.
In order to simplify the analysis, we will start analyzing this situation in absence of migration
(γ = 0) and we will characterize the steady states of a society in which there are isolated
populations and each population of individuals coordinates in an equilibrium of the stag-hunt
game. We need to know the optimal level of educational effort that parents in each population
18
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chooses in each period. This depends on the net gains for parents from transmitting their own
preferences that are given by expression V ij.
5.1 The long-run distribution of preferences in a cooperative population.
We analyze the distribution of preferences in a population where parents play and expect to be
played the cooperative equilibrium. Notice that it might happen for any pt. We denote this
population as a cooperative population.
Firstly, we calculate the net gains for parents from transmitting their own preferences ∆V i,
that is, their levels of cultural intolerance, when pt ≥ 1 − t
α. In this case, selfish players will
offer zero as proposers in the negotiation and the inequity averse players will reject the offer.
Recall that to compute V ij we suppose that a parent of type i evaluates his child’s well-being
using his own utility function. For example, when pt ≥ 1− t
α, V ae is the utility to an inequity
averse parent if his child is selfish. This child, as adult, will offer nothing to his opponent when
he is a proposer and will accept any offer as a responder. This behavior produces inequality in
the distribution of the payoffs for his child (advantageous in the first case and disadvantageous
in the second). This inequality reduces the utility in his parent’s eyes. Note that although the
expected material payoff for his child is ptB + (1 − pt)B/2, the utility for the inequity averse
parent is B/2(1 + pt)− ptβB − ptαB.
It can be verified that for selfish parents:
V ee = ptB + (1− pt)B/2, and
V ea = B/2 + (1− pt)B/2.
Therefore, the level of cultural intolerance of a selfish parent is: ∆V e = V ee−V ea = (pt−
1
2 )B ≥
0.
It can be checked also that for inequity averse parents:
V aa = B/2 + (1− pt)B/2, and
V ae = B/2(1 + pt)− ptβB − ptαB.
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Thus, the level of cultural intolerance of an inequity averse parent is: ∆V a = V aa − V ae =
B(1/2 + pt(α+ β − 1) ≥ 0.
Notice that both types of parents have strictly positive levels of cultural intolerance and
consequently, they will have incentives for active socialization.
From the previous expressions and from section 3 we can obtain the optimal educational
effort functions for both types of players when pt ≥ 1− t
α, which are:
τ∗et = k(pt −
1
2 )B(1− pt),
τ∗at = kB(1/2 + pt(α+ β − 1))pt.
Secondly, we compute the levels of cultural intolerance ∆V i when pt < 1 − t
α. Under this
condition selfish players offer the threshold which is accepted by both types of players. Recall
that the inequity averse type obtains a positive material payoff by accepting but an utility of
zero.
It can also be verified that for selfish parents:
V ee = (1− tα)B + ptt
αB + (1− pt)B/2 and
V ea = B/2 + ptt
αB + (1− pt)B/2.
Thus, the level of cultural intolerance of a selfish parent is:
∆V e = V ee − V ea = B(1/2− tα) ≥ 0.
For inequity averse parents:
V aa = B/2 + (1− pt)B/2 and
V ae = B − tαB − β(B(1− 2tα)) + pt[(t
αB − α(B(1− 2tα))] + (1− pt)B/2.
Therefore, the level of cultural intolerance of an inequity averse parent is:
∆V a = V aa − V ae = B(tα + β(1− 2tα)− 1/2) ≥ 0.
Then, if pt < 1− t
α ,
τ∗et = kB(1/2 − t
α)(1 − pt),
τ∗at = kB(t
α + β(1− 2tα)− 1/2)pt.
Substituting the previous optimal education effort functions in the equation in differences of
section 4 we get the following two-branch dynamics under the assumption of backward looking
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expectations:
Dynamics A:
pt+1 = pt + pt(1− pt)[−kBp
2
t + kB(3/2)pt − kB/2− (kptB/2 + kBp
2
t (α+ β − 1))]
if pt ≥ 1− t
α.
Dynamics B:
pt+1 = pt + pt(1− pt)[Bk(1/2 − t
α − pt/2 + ptt
α)− (kB(tα + β(1− 2tα)− 1/2)pt)]
if pt < 1− t
α.
Notice that there is a discontinuity in pt = 1− t
α = (1+α)/(1 + 2α). The phase diagram in
Figure 1 shows this case.
(Insert Figure1 here)
The following proposition characterizes the globally stable steady-state of this population.
Proposition 2 For any pt ∈ (0, 1), the preference distribution of a cooperative population con-
verges to p∗ = 1/(2β), where p∗ is such that τat (p
∗) = τ et(p
∗) in dynamics B. In this steady state
the efficient cooperative equilibrium is played.
Proof: see Appendix.
The complete and formal analysis of this result is relegated to the appendix, but let us
provide some intuition on this proposition.
Note that the dynamics has the following steady states: p = 0, p = 1 and the interior steady
state p∗ = 1/(2β), where p∗ is such that both educational effort levels get equalized under
dynamics (B).
The steady state p = 0 is unstable. This steady state is a completely homogeneous dis-
tribution of preferences, that is, all players being inequity averse. If the selfish players are in
a minority (that is, p is very close to 0), their socialization effort will be very intensive in an
attempt to offset the effect of oblique transmission. In this context, τ∗e exceeds τ∗a and the
selfish preferences will spread over generations preserving their presence in the society. A similar
argument explains why p = 1 is also unstable.
21
Page 24 of 37
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
On the other hand, in the dynamics A, τ
t
∗a is always greater than τ
t
∗e, ∀pt ∈ (0, 1). This
implies that the trajectory of dynamics A is always decreasing in the range (1− tα, 1).
Therefore, the inefficient cooperative equilibrium, in which there is surplus destruction, can
not be a steady state of the cultural dynamics. The intuition of this result is that when the
proportion of selfish players is high, i.e. for pt > (1 − t
α), selfish players follow a very greedy
strategy when they have all the bargaining power (i.e. as proposers). This yields a very high level
of cultural intolerance of inequity averse parents with respect to cultural deviation from their
own preferences ∆V a, as compared with the level of cultural intolerance of the selfish parents
∆V e. Consequently, the socialization effort of inequity averse parents is greater than that of
selfish parents, leading to a reduction of the proportion of selfish players pt over generations.
Eventually, the dynamics will reach the region where pt < (1− t
α). Then selfish players will
offer the threshold when they are proposers because of the presence of a significant fraction
of inequity averse players who will punish with rejection any greedy offer. In this branch B
of the dynamics there is an interior rest point p∗ which is the globally stable steady state. In
this steady state it is played the efficient cooperative equilibrium in which there is no surplus
destruction.
5.2 The long-run distribution of preferences in a non-cooperative popula-
tion.
Suppose now an isolated population where parents play and expect to be played the non-
cooperative equilibrium. This can only happen if pt ≥ p′ = (d − 2b)/d. Denote this population
as a non-cooperative population.
Notice that V ij = b for all type of parents. Therefore, the net gains for any type of parent
from transmitting their own preferences ∆V i, that is, their levels of cultural intolerance are zero.
But this, in turn, implies that there are not incentives at all for socialization for any parent.
Therefore, all the optimal education effort functions are zero for both types and consequently,
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in a non-cooperative group there are not incentives for socialization and the distribution of
preferences will remain unchanged, that is, pt+1 = pt.
Let us summarize this result in the next proposition:
Proposition 3 If pt ≥ p′ = (d− 2b)/d, then in a non-cooperative population any initial distri-
bution pt ≥ p′ is a stable stationary state.
( Insert Figure 2 here)
Thus, if a population coordinates in the non-cooperative equilibrium, it will remain locked
in the same distribution of preferences. The phase diagram in Figure 2 shows this case.
5.3 Migration between populations and cooperation.
In this section we will allow adult members of different populations (groups) to migrate to other
population to play the coordination game. We assume that socialization takes place inside the
population but there is a (probably small) rate of migration γ among populations. They will play
according to the expectations and customs of their new population. But in this new situation,
parents will socialize their children taking into account that when the latter become adults they
will have a positive probability of migrating and therefore playing a different equilibrium of the
group in which the children were raised.
Denote as pjo the initial distribution of preferences in a population j. For sake of simplicity,
we will suppose that there are only two groups or populations in the society.
If pjo < p′, then this population will coordinate in the unique perfect bayesian equilibrium
for this preferences distribution: the cooperative equilibrium.
But for populations such that pjo > p′, since there exists multiplicity of equilibria, more
possibilities arise. In order to discard the extreme cases in which all groups play the same equi-
librium, we will make the following Population Heterogeneity Assumption: if both populations
have pjo > p′, then we will assume that in at least one population it is played the cooperative
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equilibrium. While if in one population holds pjo < p′ and in the other p
j
o > p′, we will assume
that in the latter it is played the non-cooperative equilibrium.
Let us also assume that p′ > p∗ (which is the case for payoff d being very large in comparison
to payoff b). The next proposition states the main result of our paper.
Proposition 4 Suppose, without loss of generality, that there are two populations with initial
preference distributions, p1 and p2, and assume that both the assumption of population hetero-
geneity and p′ > p∗ hold, then for any p1, p2 ∈ (0, 1) both populations converge to a preference
distribution p∗ = 1/(2β), where the efficient cooperative equilibrium is played.
Proof: see Appendix5.
The intuition of this result is the following. Let us assume that one population is playing
the cooperative equilibrium and the other population is initially playing the non-cooperative
equilibrium. Denote as pnc the proportion of selfish players in the latter group. Notice that, at
least initially pnc > p′.
Suppose that we are in the cooperative population. In this case, the possibility of migration
to the non-cooperative population slows the trajectory to the steady state, but does not change
it qualitatively.
Suppose now that we are in the population where the non-cooperative equilibrium is played.
Parents in this group have now incentives to socialize their offspring due to the bigger utility
that their children can obtain by migrating to the cooperative group.
Moreover, the educational effort of inequity averse parents is greater than the effort of selfish
parents, given the relatively high proportion of selfish individuals (pnc) in this non cooperative
population. The educational effort might also depend indirectly on the proportion of selfish in-
dividuals in the cooperative population (pc) where their children migrate into. In particular, it
depends on both the levels of cultural intolerance ∆V i and the dynamics followed in the cooper-
ative population. If the latter follows dynamics B, these levels are independent of the population
5We are very grateful to a referee for providing a better and more concise alternative proof for this proposition.
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distribution of selfish players in the cooperative group. However, if it follows dynamics A, the
degree of cultural intolerance depends on pc, so the dynamics of the preferences distribution of
the non-cooperative group depends both on the proportions of selfish individuals in the home
population (pnc) and in the cooperative population (pc). But recall that the incentives for social-
ization under dynamics A are always greater for the inequity averse parents than for the selfish
parents as we have explained in the previous section. Therefore, as a consequence of both the
direct and the possible indirect effect, the proportion of selfish players of the non-cooperative
group (pnc) decreases over time and eventually reaches a value smaller than p′. At this point
non-cooperation is not an equilibrium and this population switches to the unique cooperative
equilibrium.
Note that if p′ < p∗, the result stated in the proposition is not always valid. It does not hold
for any initial condition of the dynamics, since it might happen that the proportion of selfish
individuals in the non-cooperative group (pnc) never gets smaller than the critical value p′. More
precisely, it can be proved that whatever the relationship between p′ and p∗, both populations
are going to converge to p∗. However, if p′ ≤ p∗, then, by assumption, one of the populations
must be playing non-cooperatively. So, migration in this case is not a sufficient condition for
the spread of cooperation between groups.
6 Conclusions.
Cultural transmission plays an important role in the formation of many preference traits and
norms, like attitudes towards family, in the job market and cooperation. The aim of this paper
is to analyze if cooperation can be the product of cultural evolution in a stag hunt game. Most
of the economic interactions that turn out to have a coordination game structure are actually
sequential two-stage games. Players firstly make productive decisions, generating a joint surplus,
and subsequently, they bargain over its division among them. Moreover, if the players´ choices
made in the production stage determine the distribution of bargaining power in the second
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distributive stage, this stag hunt game is known as the assurance or mutualism game.
We have presented an overlapping generations model with cultural transmission of prefer-
ences where the distribution of preferences in the population and the strategies in the two–stage
coordination game are determined endogenously and simultaneously. We assume that there are
several groups in the society, some of them play cooperatively and others do not. Socializa-
tion takes place inside the group, but there is a positive rate of migration among groups which
parents anticipate. We show how all groups converge to the cooperative equilibrium.
If the shares in the division of the surplus are predetermined, that is, not the consequence
of negotiation with different previous-choice-dependent bargaining powers, then the two-stage
game results in a coordination game only if d ≤ 2b. In this class of stag hunt games migration and
cultural transmission do not yield global convergence to the cooperative equilibrium. The reason
is that non-cooperation is an equilibrium for any preference distribution, even with a very high
proportion of other-regarding individuals. Which additional features of cultural transmission,
if any, can solve convergence to cooperation in this latter class of stag hunt games belongs to
future research.
A natural future extension of our work is to explore the effects of different types of influences
among groups (other than migration), as for instance, the existence of a degree of interaction in
oblique transmission. We will also consider the effects of other biased cultural mechanisms such
as conformism or prestige-based imitation.
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APPENDIX.
Proof of lemma 2.
We will show that there is not unilateral profitable deviation for any type of player if players
pool in cooperation (C) in the first stage. Suppose first that pt ≥ (1 − t
α). Selfish players, as
proposers, will offer 0 to their opponents and will accept any offer when they are responders.
The expected payoff of choosing C for the selfish type will be ptB + (1− pt)B/2.
If this type of player deviates to NC, he will obtain an expected payoff of ptd. As it can be
checked this type of player will not deviate.
On the other hand, a strongly inequity averse type of player will offer half of the surplus when she
is the proposer, and this offer will be accepted by both types of players, obtaining an expected
payoff of (1/2)B. But when she is the responder, she will only accept the threshold level and
as the selfish player will offer nothing. So she will reject the offer and both players will have a
payoff of 0 with probability pt, but with probability (1− pt) the inequity averse opponent will
offer B to her. In summary, the expected payoff of an inequity averse player of choosing C will
be (1/2)B + (1/2)(1 − pt)B = ptB/2 + (1− pt)B.
Her expected payoff of deviating to NC will be d/2. Therefore, choosing C is also a best response
for this type of player.
Suppose now that pt < (1− t
α). In this case selfish players offer tα2B when they are proposers.
The expected payoff of choosing C for a selfish type will be ptB + (1− pt)(1− t
α + 1/2)B.
If he deviates to NC his expected payoff will be (1 − tα)d. As (1 − tα) ∈ (1/2, 3/4), then this
player will not deviate.
The utility of inequity averse players of playing C in this case will be B/2 + (1− pt)B/2.
A deviation to NC yields a payoff of (d/2) smaller than that from C.
Proof of lemma 3.
Let us check under which conditions there is an equilibrium where players choose the non
cooperative action in the production stage of the stag hunt game. In this pool both types of
players obtain a payoff of b.
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Suppose that players believe that a deviation to cooperation comes from a selfish player. Then,
if a selfish player deviates by choosing C, he will obtain a payoff of 0 when matched with a selfish
opponent and (d/2) when matched with an inequity averse opponent. Therefore, the expected
payoff of the deviation is (1 − pt)d/2. Thus, the selfish players will not deviate from choosing
NC if b ≥ (1− pt)d/2, that is, if pt ≥ (d− 2b)/d.
Notice that exactly the same argument applies for the inequity averse type under the proposed
off-equilibrium beliefs.
Proof that there is not a separating equilibrium in the two-stage game with
incomplete information.
Let us firstly check that selfish players choosing C and inequity averse players choosing NC
is not an equilibrium.
The expected payoff for an inequity averse player in this strategy combination is pt(d/2) +
(1 − pt)b. Deviating to C and given that players expect C from a selfish player, the inequity
averse deviator obtains a payoff of ptB/2 + (1 − pt)(d/2). So the inequity averse type deviates
imitating the selfish type.
Consider now a situation in which selfish players choose NC and inequity averse players
choose C. Let us check if this strategy profile constitutes an equilibrium.
The expected payoff for a selfish player in this profile is ptb + (1 − pt)(1 − t
α)d and for an
inequity averse player is (1− pt)B.
The selfish type imitating the inequity averse player gets an expected payoff of pt(t
αd) +
(1 − pt)(1 − t
α + 12 )B. Therefore, the incentive constraint for the selfish player holds if pt ≥
pa(tα) = B(1−t
α+1/2)−(1−tα)d
B(1−tα+1/2)−(d−b) .
On the other hand, the inequity averse type imitating the selfish type gets an expected payoff
of ptb+ (1 − pt)(d/2).Therefore, the incentive constraint for the inequity averse type holds if
pt ≤ p
b = B−d/2B−d/2+b .
But pa(tα) > pb for all tα ∈ (1/4, 1/2).Notice that this unequality holds for tα = 1/4 and
for tα = 1/2, and the function f(tα) = pa(tα)− pb is monotone.
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Therefore, we conclude that the set of preference distributions for which the incentive con-
traints of both types hold simultaneously is empty.
Proof of proposition 2.
According to dynamics A, τat is always greater than τ
e
t, ∀pt ∈ (0, 1). This is because the
equation: (α+ β)p2t − pt + 1/2 = 0, has no real roots.
This implies that the behavior of dynamics (A) is always decreasing in the range (1− tα, 1)
and eventually pt will fall below (1− t
α).
Under assumption (2), p∗ = 1/(2β) ≤ 1 − tα , then dynamics (B), defined in the interval
[0, 1 − tα), has an homogeneous steady state p = 0 which is unstable and an interior steady
state p = p∗ = 1/(2β) which is globally stable, where p∗ is such that τ∗e = τ ∗a. (See, Bisin and
Verdier, 2001, Proposition 1).
Proof of proposition 4.
First, we will introduce some additional notation. Denote ∆V ij the level of cultural intoler-
ance of a parent of type i when he is in population j and his child has a probability γ of migrating
to the other population −j, where i = e, a and j = 1, 2. Therefore, ∆V ij = (1−γ)∆V
i
j +γ∆V
i
−j.
Let τ ij denote the educational effort that type i in population j would exert if population j
were in isolation.
We define τ ij as the effort put into cultural transmission by an agent of type i in population
j when that population is not in isolation. Note that τ ej = k ∆V
e
j(1− p
j) and τaj = k ∆V
a
jp
j.
Then,
τ ej = (1− γ) τ
e
j + γτ
e
−j(
1−pj
1−p−j
)
τaj = (1− γ) τ
a
j + γτ
a
−j(
pj
p−j
)
We know from the dynamic behavior of pj (equation (7)) that pjt+1 − p
j
t and τ
e
j − τ
a
j have
the same sign. Then we can compute:
τ ej − τ
a
j = (1− γ) (τ
e
j − τ
a
j ) + γ[τ
e
−j(
1−pj
1−p−j
)− τa
−j(
pj
p−j
)] (A)
We are interested in the direction and the convergence of the dynamics, that is, whether pj
is decreasing or decreasing and whether it converges to p∗.
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Let us assume that population 1 is playing the cooperative equilibrium and population 2 is
initially playing the non-cooperative equilibrium, that is, p2 ≥ p′. Then we have
τ e1 − τ
a
1 = (1− γ) (τ
e
1 − τ
a
1) (B)
τ e2 − τ
a
2 = γ[τ
e
1(
1−p2
1−p1
)− τa1(
p2
p1
)] (C).
Clearly as long as p2 ≥ p′, population 1 is going to behave as if it were in isolation.
Hence, as long as p2 ≥ p′, we have that p1 will tend to p∗, independently if p1 is greater
or smaller than p′. One of two things can happen. If p1 converges to p∗ while p2 > p∗, then
p1 = p∗ < p′ ≤ p2. If we look at equation C, we see that p2 is decreasing. Consequently, it must
eventually be the case that p2 < p′. At this point, both populations are playing the cooperative
equilibrium. The other possibility is that before p1 converges to p∗, p2 becomes smaller than p′.
At this point both populations are playing also the cooperative equilibrium.
Therefore, it only remains to be proved convergence to p∗ when both populations play the
cooperative equilibrium in the presence of migration. Assume without loss of generality that
p1 < p2.
If both p1, p2 < p∗ < p′ (or p′ > p1, p2 > p∗) then it is easy to check with equation A that
both populations converge to p∗.
Problems might arise when p1 < p∗ < p2 < p′. We will denote by ∆V ij (B), the level of
cultural intolerance of parents in a cooperative group if it follows dynamics B and ∆V ij (A), if it
follows dynamics A. Recall that in the first case this level is a constant and in the second one
depends on the proportion pj.
Assume first that both populations follow dynamics B, that is, p2 < 1−tα. Then substituting
in equation A,
τ ej − τ
a
j = k (∆V
e
j (B)(1− p
j)− ∆V aj(B)p
j).
This expression is positive for p1 < p∗ and it is negative for p2 > p∗. Therefore both, p1 and
p2 tend to p∗
Now consider that p′ > p2 > 1− tα. Hence, population 1 follows dynamics B and population
2 follows initially dynamics A. The sign of τ e1 − τ
a
1 is at first glance undetermined because the
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first term of equation A is positive but the second is negative. However, τ e2 − τ
a
2 is negative,
substituting in equation A,
τ e2 − τ
a
2 = (1− γ)k(∆V
e
2 (A)(1 − p
2)− ∆V a2 (A)p
2) + γk (∆V e2 (B)(1− p
2)− ∆V a2 (B)p
2).
We know that in the dynamics A, τa is always greater than τ e, ∀pt ∈ (0, 1).Therefore, the
first term is negative, but the second term is also negative because p2 > p∗. Consequently, p2 is
decreasing and it must eventually be the case that p2 < 1− tα. At this point both populations
are following dynamics B.
For completeness, let us show convergence to p∗for both populations when p′ < p∗. Of
course, if both pj are less than p′ < p∗, then they will both tend to increase. Hence, we must
eventually arrive at the case where at least one pj > p′. So in this case, let us suppose that
population 1 plays cooperatively, and population 2 plays non-cooperatively. As before, p1 will
tend to p∗.If p∗ ≈ p1 < p2, then p2, by dynamics B or A, will decrease to p∗ and if p∗ ≈ p1 > p2,
then p2, by dynamics B, will increase to p∗.
So we can see that whatever the relationship between p′ and p∗, both populations are going
to converge to p∗. However, if p′ ≤ p∗, then, by assumption, one of the populations must be
playing non-cooperatively.
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